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GETTING AROUND THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT: THE SUPREME COURT SETS THE 
LIMITS OF RACIAL VOTING 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE SOUTH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act (the "Act")! in 1965 in 
response to the "long and sorry history of resistance to the Fifteenth 
Amendment[],"2 Section 5 of the Act, which requires certain juris-
dictions to preclear changes to their electoral systems, was intended 
to "eradicat[e] the continuing effects of past discrimination" in the 
jurisdictions covered by the Act, and "insure that old devices for 
disenfranchisement would not simply be replaced by new ones."3 
Racial voting discrimination was not eradicated by the work of the 
"freedom riders" in the 1960s and early 1970s. Implementation of 
the Act eliminated the more flagrant methods of voting discrimi-
nation, such as literacy tests and poll taxes. Nevertheless, minority 
disenfranchisement continues in many Southern states through the 
use of practices such as annexations and redistricting and by the 
enactment of electoral systems which dilute the minority vote. De-
spite the victories of the civil rights movement in recent decades, 
voting discrimination has continued into the 1990s.4 
The Supreme Court has espoused inconsistent interpretations 
of Section 5 of the Act. The Court has adopted dual standards of 
review for cases involving annexations and for cases involving other 
methods of voter discrimination. This Note will explore the devel-
opment of these dual standards, and examine whether the stan-
I Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)). 
2 City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 379 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
3 City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 141 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6,12,44 (1982)). 
4 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Norfolk, VA., 883 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989) (case brought 
under § 2 of the Act, alleging that the city's at-large electoral system diluted black voting 
strength and that the system had been maintained for a discriminatory purpose, remanded 
by the circuit court to the district court in 1989). See also Gunn v. Chickasaw County, 
Mississippi, 705 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (plan precleared under § 5 by the U.S. 
Attorney General's office in 1983 was held by the district court in 1989 to violate § 2 of the 
Act); Panel Discussion, The Voting Rights Act and Judicial Elections: An Update on Current 
Litigation, 73 JUDICATURE 74 (1989). The cases described in the above article specifically 
address discrimination in judicial elections and were brought under § 2 as well as § 5 of the 
Act. The scope of this Note is limited to a discussion of § 5 of the Act. 
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dards can be reconciled, both with one another, and with the intent 
of Congress in passing the Voting Rights Act. Section II provides 
the historical background of the Act and shows the century-long 
defiance of the fifteenth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution which led to the passage of the Act. Section III describes the 
development of the dual standards of review by the Supreme Court: 
a "fairness" standard for annexation cases, and a "retrogression" 
standard for other electoral changes. Section IV examines the two 
standards of review in relation to one another and in light of 
congressional intent with respect to the Act. 
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
A. The Reconstruction and Its Aftermath 
Resistance to the voting rights of blacks by Southern states has 
persisted since the end of the Civil War despite the passage of the 
fifteenth amendment.5 From the onset of Reconstruction, Southern 
states both refused to acknowledge and actively obstructed the vot-
ing rights of black citizens.6 The "Black Codes" were passed 
throughout the South, severely limiting the civil rights of blacks.7 
In Mississippi, for example, the Black Codes provided that blacks 
could not testify in trials involving white plaintiffs and defendants, 
could not sit on juries, and could not intermarry with whites, and 
they also provided strict vagrancy laws as a means of controlling 
blacks.s In response to the Black Codes and other overtly discrim-
inatory actions of Southern states,9 Congress passed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and 1868, which 
gave all males over twenty-one years of age the right to vote, but 
excluded former Confederates and Confederate supporters. lO AI-
5 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 
6 For example, South Carolina's first Reconstruction Constitutional Convention in Sep-
tember, 1865, under a Unionist governor, limited voting and office-holding to free white 
men. See McDonald, An Aristocracy of Voters: The Disenfranchisement of Blacks in South Carolina, 
37 S.C.L.R. 557, 558 (1986). 
7 See McDonald, supra note 6, at 558; Hunter, Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights 
Act in North Carolina, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 255, 256 (1987). 
8 L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 504-05 (1985). 
9 For example,. refusing to ratify the fourteenth amendment. See Hunter, supra note 7, 
at 256. 
10 McDonald, supra note 6, at 559. 
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though electoral participation of blacks improved,I1 "[t]he majority 
of whites never acquiesced in the sharing of political power with 
blacks, and a violent opposition to black enfranchisement devel-
oped. The Ku Klux Klan became widely active ... and political 
intimidation, including assassination, was commonplace."12 
In the years following the end of Reconstruction in 1877, 
Southern Democrats regained control of state legislatures, and en-
acted new voting laws patterned on the "Mississippi plan."13 These 
laws included literacy and comprehension tests, poll taxes, and strin-
gent registration deadlines. 14 These requirements were an effective 
method of disenfranchising blacks since, as of 1890, approximately 
two-thirds of adult Southern blacks were illiterate, whereas less than 
one-quarter of adult Southern whites were illiterate. 15 In addition, 
legislatures established alternative tests, such as grandfather clauses 
and property qualifications, in order to prevent illiterate whites 
from being denied the right to vote. 16 Not surprisingly, the black 
voting rate sharply declined. In Mississippi, for example, the per-
centage of blacks eligible to vote dropped from over fifty percent 
to about five percentP The disenfranchisement of Southern blacks 
was far from temporary; there was little, if any, improvement in 
the decades that followed. As of the early 1960s, only 6.7 percent 
of black Mississippians were registered to vote. 18 
B. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its Effect 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed to enforce the 
fifteenth amendment, so as to give blacks and other minorities access 
to the electoral process. In Section 2 of the Act, Congress provided 
for the protection of the voting rights of minorities throughout the 
country. Using broad language, this Section prohibits the "denial 
II At the second Reconstruction Constitutional Convention in South Carolina in 1867, 
76 out of 124 delegates were black. McDonald, supra note 6, at 559. 
12 Id. at 560. 
13 Hunter, supra note 7, at 259. The "Mississippi plan" was designed to reclaim state 
governments for white Democrats "through the systematic use of terrorism and violence." 
McDonald, supra note 6, at 562. 
14 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 7, at 259-60; McDonald, supra note 6, at 567-71; Note, 
Mississippi and the Voting Rights Act: 1965-1982, 52 MISS. L.J. 803, 831 (1982). 
15 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311. 
16 Id. 
17 Note, supra note 14, at 832. 
18 [d. at 803. 
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or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color .... "19 
In light of the century of resistance to the fifteenth amendment 
in some parts of the country, Congress recognized that the provi-
sions of Section 2 alone could not effectively combat the special 
problems presented by the history of racial discrimination and low 
minority voter participation in those parts of the country. Thus, in 
an "uncommon exercise" of authority,20 Congress provided addi-
tional protection in Section 5 for the voting rights of minorities in 
"covered jurisdictions," those jurisdictions with a history of system-
atic exclusion of minorities from the electoral process.21 Section 5 
provides that every jurisdiction covered by Section 4(b) of the Act 
must submit any changes in their electoral systems to the Attorney 
General or to the District Court in the District of Columbia for 
preclearance.22 A covered jurisdiction may not enforce any such 
19 Section 2, as amended, reads: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guar-
antees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the 
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination 
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation 
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that 
its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent 
to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or 
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That 
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class 
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). 
20 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334. 
21 Application of § 5 to a State is designated in § 4(b) of the Act, and applies 
in any State or in any political subdivision of a State which (1) the Attorney General 
determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect 
to which (2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of 
such persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, 
or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election 
of November 1964. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982). "Covered" jurisdictions in 1965 included the states of Alabama, 
Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia, twenty-six counties in 
North Carolina, three counties in Arizona, one county in Hawaii and one county in Idaho. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 318. 
n Section 5, as amended, provides: 
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set 
forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the 
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change submitted to the District Court unless it obtains a declaratory 
judgment from that court that the change "does not have the pur-
pose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color."23 Similarly, if the proposed 
change is submitted to the Attorney General, a covered jurisdiction 
is prohibited from enforcing the change unless the Attorney Gen-
eral does not make an objection within sixty days.24 Under the 
preclearance provision, the jurisdiction submitting the electoral 
changes bears the burden of showing that the change has no dis-
criminatory "purpose or effect."25 
By enacting Section 5, Congress enhanced the power of the 
Justice Department to fight racial discrimination in voting by giving 
first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to 
administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, 
or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on No-
vember 1, 1964, or ... on November 1, 1968, or ... on November 1, 1972, such 
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prereq-
uisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or 
in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, and 
unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right 
to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice 
or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or 
procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequi-
site, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer 
or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General 
and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after 
such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval 
within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively 
indicated that such objection will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication by 
the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's 
failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a 
subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indi-
cates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day period following receipt of 
a submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to reexamine the submis-
sion if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the 
sixty-day period which would otherwise require objection in accordance with this 
section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of 
three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 and any 
appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). 
23 Beerv. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b as amended 
(1970». 
24 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 320. 
25 Ball, The Perpetuation of Racial Vote Dilution: An Examination of Some Constraints on the 
Effective Administration of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as Amended in 1982, 28 HOWARD L.J. 433, 
438 (1985). 
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the Attorney General the power to monitor more effectively 
changes in electoral procedures in those areas of the country with 
a history of discriminatory voting practices.26 Prior to the enactment 
of Section 5, Justice Department litigation, even when supple-
mented by private causes of action, was an ineffective check against 
states and municipalities with discriminatory voting procedures. By 
enacting Section 5, Congress implicitly acknowledged that the pre-
vious system was not adequate to battle the systematic exclusion of 
minorities embedded in the practices of many states, particularly 
those in the South.27 As the Supreme Court described the Act in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, "[t]he measure prescribes remedies for 
voting discrimination which go into effect without any need for 
prior adjudication."28 
Section 5 is a preventative measure. By requiring that electoral 
changes be precleared by the Attorney General or the District Court 
for the District of Columbia, it prevents the enactment of new 
methods of voter discrimination.29 The preclearance provision of 
Section 5 allows the Justice Department to monitor electoral changes 
in the covered jurisdictions and thus facilitates the prevention of 
new forms of discrimination in those areas with a history of racial 
voting discrimination. 
Since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, voting discrimi-
nation has shifted from overt means of discrimination, such as poll 
taxes and literacy tests, to new, subtle forms of discrimination which 
dilute the minority vote.30 These new types of discrimination have 
emerged in several forms. Annexations enlarge a city's boundaries, 
often changing the racial makeup of the electorate.31 Redistricting 
redraws the voting districts within a city (or other political subdivi-
26 Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Attorney General was given the power 
to seek injunction against public and private discrimination in voting rights. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1960 gave the Attorney General access to voting records. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 
313. 
27 Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 396 (1971). See also Note, Getting Results Under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 139, 141 (1984). 
28 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327-28. 
29 "Since the DO] began to implement Section 5 ... 'the most frequent use of Section 
5 ... has been to combat practices which were not identified as discriminatory when the 
Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965.'" Ball, supra note 25, at 439 (quoting D. HUNTER, 
FEDERAL REVIEW OF VOTING CHANGES 10 (1975)). 
30 See id. at 439. 
31 For an example of an annexation, assume a city annexes a suburban town. After the 
annexation, the suburban town would cease to exist as a separate entity, but would instead 
be part of the enlarged city. 
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sion).32 In addition, electoral systems which dilute the minority vote 
have emerged.33 
Among the most common of the discriminatory electoral sys-
tems are at-large elections, majority vote requirements and num-
bered post systems. In at-large voting systems, candidates are 
elected by entire jurisdictions, rather than by district. These systems 
can dilute the minority vote where racial bloc voting exists.34 For 
example, in a jurisdiction where 45 percent of the voters are black 
and 55 percent are white, if the white voters vote as a bloc in an at-
large election, the black voters foreseeably could never be repre-
sented. Similarly, in a majority-rule jurisdiction, a run-off election 
is required when no candidate has a clear majority. In such a system, 
a black voting minority may never be able to elect the candidate it, 
as a bloc, supports.35 
Finally, in a numbered post system, a candidate mu~t specify 
by number which office he or she is seeking.36 Thus, each race 
becomes "effectively a separate election for a separate office."37 
Since votes are cast for each post, a majority voting as a bloc could 
elect all of the candidates, rather than electing the number of can-
didates proportionate to its voting strength. Under this system, the 
voting strength of a minority could be completely eliminated. 
Despite the intentions behind Section 5,38 the practices 
which the Act was designed to eliminate have persisted since its 
32 In contrast to an annexation. redistricting does not involve the enlargement of a city's 
physical boundaries. Redistricting is the redrawing of electoral district lines within a city's 
existing boundaries. 
33 Ball, supra note 25, at 439. 
34 Racial bloc voting can be defined as "systematic voting among an identifiable racial 
group." See Ball, supra note 25, at 435 n.lO. The political strength of a minority voting group 
can be diluted or even completely eliminated by the bloc vote of the majority. 
35 See Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982). To illustrate this, assume 
a municipality has a 45 percent black voting minority and a 55 percent white voting majority. 
If the black minority votes as a bloc, its candidate will receive only 45 percent of the vote. 
Thus, in a run-off with the next-highest vote-getter, if the white majority votes as a bloc, the 
candidate supported by the black minority will never receive over 50 percent of the vote. 
36 For example, in a municipality where there are three city council positions, a candidate 
must specify which post he or she is seeking, e.g. "Council Seat Number 2." Voters cast 
ballots for each of the three seats, rather than for a single candidate. Thus, rather than 
electing the three candidates with the highest number of votes, which would allow a minority 
of over 33 percent to elect one candidate, the majority can elect the candidates to all of the 
posts. 
37 Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 127 (1983). 
38 In Katzenbach, the Court described the purpose of § 5 as being "to banish the blight 
of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our 
country for nearly a century." 383 U.S. at 308. 
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passage.39 A 1981 study revealed that in covered jurisdictions, at-
large election systems existed in 76 percent of municipalities with 
black majorities and in 59 percent of municipalities with black mi-
norities.40 None of these municipalities with at-large systems had 
any black representatives on the local councils.41 The remainder of 
this Note examines how discriminatory voting practices have been 
perpetuated since the Act was passed. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUAL STANDARDS BY THE SUPREME 
COURT UNDER SECTION 5 
One year after Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, the 
Supreme Court gave it a clear, decisive endorsement in the face of 
a challenge to its constitutionality.42 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
the state of South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights Act in general, and also attacked specific provisions 
of the Act, including Section 5.43 The Voting Rights Act suspended 
South Carolina's use of a literacy test to bar black voters.44 In ad-
dition, the state wished to change its electoral laws without Section 
5 preclearance.45 South Carolina challenged the Act on the grounds 
that it encroached on states' rights and exceeded congressional 
power.46 The Supreme Court overruled the arguments of South 
Carolina and the other states, calling the Act an '''appropriate' 
measure[]" by Congress under Section 2 of the fifteenth amend-
mentY 
39 For example, thirteen counties in Mississippi replaced district election with at-large 
elections without getting preclearance. Note, supra note 14, at 843. 
40 Ball, supra note 25, at 436 (referring to UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 40 (1981». 
41 [d. 
42 The Court stated: "The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
prior decisions construing its several provisions, and the general doctrines of constitutional 
interpretation, all point to one fundamental principle. As against the reserved powers of the 
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of 
racial discrimination in voting." 383 U.S. at 324. 
43 [d. at 323. 
44 [d. at 319. 
45 [d. at 320. 
46 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323. Specifically, the state challenged the constitutionality of 
§§ 4(a)-(d), 5, 6(b), 7, 9, 13(a) and certain provisions of § 14. [d. at 317. South Carolina also 
argued that § 4(a)-(d) violates equality of the states, due process and· separation of powers 
and constitutes a bill of attainder; that § 5 infringes on Article III by directing the district 
court to issue advisory opinions; and that §§ 6(b), 9 and 14(b) violate due process. [d. at 323. 
47 [d. at 308. Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi and Georgia argued as amici 
curiae in support of South Carolina. [d. at 305-06. 
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In upholding the Act in Katzenbach, the Supreme Court enum-
erated Congress' reasons for passing the Act: 
First: Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and per-
vasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our 
country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the 
Constitution. Second: Congress concluded that the unsuccessful 
remedies which it had prescribed in the past would have to be 
replaced by sterner, and more elaborate measures in order to 
satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.48 
In the years following South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme 
Court has redefined the scope and intent of Section 5. In preclear-
ance cases involving electoral changes by virtue of an annexation, 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 5 has evolved into a 
"fairness" test. In these cases, election plans must be found by the 
Court to be "fairly designed."49 In preclearance cases involving 
redistricting and other electoral changes, however, the Court has 
adopted a "retrogression" standard. Under this standard, electoral 
changes which are discriminatory can be precleared so long as the 
discrimination in the proposed plan is not any worse than under 
the existing plan.50 
The Supreme Court's interpretations of Section 5 with respect 
to electoral changes through annexations and redistricting are in-
consistent with each other and have fallen short of the goals her-
alded in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. In Katzenbach, the Court stated: 
"The Voting Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention to 
rid the country of racial discrimination in voting."51 By reading the 
retrogression standard into Section 5, however, the Supreme Court 
has allowed voting discrimination to be perpetuated. The Court has 
upheld discriminatory electoral plans, "[a]lthough [a] plan may ... 
remain[] discriminatory, [if] it nevertheless [is] not a regressive 
change."52 This perpetuation of discriminatory practices clearly 
does not further the goal of ridding the country of racial discrimi-
nation in voting. The "fairness" standard, on the other hand, comes 
closer to the goals espoused in Katzenbach. As this standard has 
48 Id. at 309. 
49 City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370 (1975). The "fairness" standard 
is discussed infra, at text accompanying notes 54-103. 
50 See infra, text accompanying notes 104-144. 
51 Kalzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315. 
5. LocRharl, 460 U.S. at 134. 
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evolved, courts may now require an improvement in the electoral 
system as a condition of preclearance. 53 
A. The "Fairness" Standard For Annexations 
The "fairness" standard, which the Court has applied to an-
nexation cases, has undergone a series of changes over the last two 
decades, providing broader protection of minority voting rights as 
it has evolved. Electoral changes caused by annexations were first 
held to be subject to Section 5 preclearance requirements in a 1971 
case, Perkins v. Matthews. 54 In Perkins v. Matthews, the appellants, 
voters and candidates in Canton, Mississippi, sought an injunction 
against enforcement of electoral changes, including an annexation, 
without Section 5 preclearance. 55 The Supreme Court held that the 
extension of a city's boundaries through annexation is not exempt 
from Section 5 preclearance: 
Changing boundary lines by annexations which enlarge the 
city's number of eligible voters ... constitutes the change of a 
'standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.' Clearly, 
revision of boundary lines has an effect on voting in two ways: 
(1) by including certain voters within the city and leaving others 
outside, it determines who may vote in the municipal election 
and who may not; (2) it dilutes the weight of the votes of the 
voters to whom the franchise was limited before the annexation 
.... Moreover, [Section] 5 was designed to cover changes having 
a potential for racial discrimination in voting, and such potential 
inheres in a change in the composition of the electorate affected 
by an annexation. 56 
Thus, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that an annexation 
was a per se change to a jurisdiction's electoral system and therefore 
is covered by Section 5 of the Act. 
In a 1987 case, the Court reaffirmed the holding in Perkins, 
and broadened the scope of Section 5 coverage in annexation cases. 
In City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, the Court held that a city's 
decision not to annex an area was subject to Section 5 preclearance. 57 
In that case, a sparsely populated parcel inhabited solely by whites 
and a vacant parcel were annexed by an Alabama city, while a 
neighboring area, populated by blacks, was not. Inhabitants of the 
53 See infra discussion of Port Arthur v. United States, text accompanying notes 86-103. 
54 400 U.S. 379 (1971). 
55 [d. at 382. 
56 [d. at 388-89. 
57 479 U.S. 462, 470-72 (1987). 
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latter area petitioned the city for annexation and were refused. 58 
The Attorney General refused to preclear the annexed parcels,59 
and the district court also refused preclearance on the ground that 
"a community may not annex adjacent white areas while applying 
a wholly different standard to black areas and failing to annex them 
based on that discriminatory standard."60 In affirming the decision 
of the district court, the Supreme Court stated that although "the 
annexations did not reduce the proportion of black voters or deny 
existing black voters representation ... Section 5 looks not only to 
the present effects of changes, but to their future effects as well 
.... [A]n impermissible purpose under [Section] 5 may relate to 
anticipated as well as present circumstances."61 Thus, the Court 
expanded the use of Section 5 as a powerful means to eradicate 
discrimination in cases involving an annexation. 
In City of Petersburg, Virginia v. United States,62 a 1972 annexation 
case which caused present changes to the electoral power of blacks, 
the city sought to annex an area which would increase the white 
population from 16,402 to 23,447, while increasing the black pop-
ulation from 19,701 to only 19,947.63 This would change the black 
population majority of 55 percent to a minority of 46 percent.64 
The three judge district court explained the connection between 
the annexation and voting discrimination through minority vote 
dilution: 
The dilution here has occurred as a result of the annexation in 
the context of at-large elections and bloc-voting by race, and 
under these circumstances it abridges the right to vote on ac-
count of color by impairing the ability of blacks to elect candi-
dates of their choice and to have their ideas on political matters 
afforded the recognition to which they are entitled on the merits 
and by virtue of their individual citizenship and their numerical 
strength in the community.65 
58 [d. at 466. 
59 [d. 
60 [d. at 467 (quoting the district court opinion, 568 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (D.D.C. 1983)). 
61 [d. at 470-71. The Court reasoned: "One means of thwarting [racial integration] is 
to provide for the growth of a monolithic white voting block, thereby effectively diluting the 
black vote in advance. This is just as impermissible a purpose as the dilution of present black 
voting strength." [d. at 472. 
62 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), afl'd 410 U.S. 962 (1973). 
63 [d. at 1024. 
64 [d. 
65 [d. at 1029. 
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In Petersburg, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district 
court's conditional approval of the proposed annexation.66 The ap-
proval was conditioned on modifications of the electoral system 
"calculated to neutralize ... any adverse effect upon the political 
participation of black voters ... i.e., that the [city of Petersburg] 
shift from an at-large to a ward system of electing its city council-
men."67 By adopting this "neutralization" standard, the district court 
was thus able to require that the city make a progressive change in 
its electoral system as a means to balance the adverse effect the 
annexation would have on the political strength of black voters.68 
The Court further refined the standard of Section 5 in annex-
ation cases in a 1975 case, City of Richmond v. United States. 69 Richmond 
involved an annexation of a portion of Chesterfield County, Vir-
ginia, which would decrease the percentage of blacks living in the 
city from 52 percent to 42 percent.70 The annexation was submitted 
to the Attorney General for preclearance, and was denied.7l The 
Attorney General recommended that the at-large election system 
be replaced with a single-member district system in order to mini-
mize the adverse racial effects that would be caused by the annex-
ation. 72 The city and the Attorney General submitted to the district 
court as a consent judgment a nine-ward plan in which four wards 
would have substantial black majorities and one ward would have a 
split of approximately 59 percent white and 41 percent black.73 The 
district court rejected the plan, finding that the city had not shown 
a legitimate purpose for the annexation. 74 The district court further 
66 410 U.S. 962 (1973). 
67 Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1031. 
68 The replacement of the at-large system, which can dilute the black vote, with a ward, 
or district system of voting can be viewed as a progressive change. Rather than electing 
candidates on a jurisdiction-wide basis, in which a majority voting as a bloc could foreseeably 
succeed in electing its candidate every time, the jurisdiction is broken down into districts. 
Since in Petersburg the black minority was substantial (46 percent), id. at 1024, it was likely 
that one or more of the districts would have a black voting majority. Thus, the effects of 
racial bloc voting could be lessened and minority voting groups would be more likely to be 
afforded representation. See supra note 34. 
69 422 U.S. 358 (1975). 
70 Id. at 363. 
71 Id. at 363-64. 
72 Id. at 364. The Attorney General's proposal here was very similar to the district court's 
condition on the approval of the annexation in Petersburg. See supra text accompanying notes 
62-68. 
73 Id. at 366. 
74 Id. at 367. The district court referred the case to a Special Master for recommenda-
tions. Based on the findings of the Special Master, the district court stated that the city's 
"1970 changes in its election practices following upon the annexation were discriminatory in 
purpose and effect and thus violative of Section 5[] ...... Id. at 366-67. 
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found that the proposed nine-ward system did not "minimize[] the 
dilution of black voting power to the greatest possible extent."75 The 
district court thus declined to approve the annexation because it 
"had the forbidden effect of denying the right to vote of the Negro 
community in Richmond."76 
On review, the Supreme Court's opinion in Richmond made 
clear that the bare fact of a reduction in bloc voting strength will 
not be enough to establish a violation of Section 5. In vacating the 
decision of the district court, the Supreme Court acknowledged its 
recognition in Perkins that "changes in city boundaries by annexa-
tion have sufficient potential for denying or abridging the right to 
vote .... "77 The Supreme Court specifically limited its holding in 
Perkins, however: "[W]e did not hold in Perkins that every annexa-
tion effecting a reduction in the percentage of Negroes in the city's 
population is prohibited by [Section] 5."78 The Court laid out a two-
step test to determine whether an annexation violates Section 5. 
First, a court must determine that legitimate, verifiable reasons for 
the annexation are demonstrated by the city.79 Second, a court must 
find that an election plan, such as the ward plan in Richmond, is 
"fairly designed" in order to "afford [minorities] representation 
reasonably equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged 
community."80 Thus, in order to uphold the city's annexation in 
Richmond, the Supreme Court fashioned a "fairness" standard by 
which to determine the permissibility of an annexation. The Court 
explained: 
To hold otherwise would be either to forbid all such annexations 
or to require, as the price for approval of the annexation, that 
the black community be assigned the same proportion of council 
seats as before, hence perhaps permanently overrepresenting 
them and underrepresenting other elements in the community, 
including the nonblack citizens in the annexed area.81 
The Supreme Court remanded the issue of whether the Richmond 
annexation was legitimate under the "fairness" test.82 
75 [d. at 367. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. at 368. 
78 [d. 
79 [d. at 372. Valid reasons for annexation include, e.g., broadening the tax base and 
expanding potential for growth. See also Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1024. 
80 Richmond, 422 U.S. at 370. 
81 [d. at 371. 
82 [d. at 379. In upholding preclearance coverage for future effects of an annexation in 
Pleasant Grove v. United States, the Supreme Court drew on Richmond, citing its reasoning: 
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the "neu-
tralization" standard embraced by the district court in City of 
PetersburgB3 should be applied in the Richmond case.84 Justice Bren-
nan argued that "the dilutive effect of an annexation of this sort 
can be cured only by a ward plan 'calculated to neutralize ... any 
adverse effect upon the political participation of black voters.'''85 
The Supreme Court drew on Justice Brennan's Richmond dis-
sent in its opinion in Port Arthur v. United States, decided in 1982.86 
Port Arthur involved the consolidation of two neighboring Texas 
cities and the annexation of an incorporated area, resulting in the 
decrease in the percentage of blacks in the population in Port 
Arthur from 45.21 percent to 40.56 percent.87 The city also wanted 
to expand its city council from six council members and a mayor to 
eight council members and a mayor.88 All council seats were to be 
governed by a majority vote rule.89 The district court found that 
there were legitimate reasons for the annexation, such as increased 
tax revenue and the hope of attracting new businesses and creating 
new jobs.90 Thus, under the Richmond standard, the annexation 
could not be denied as discriminatory in purpose.~l The district 
court refused to approve the plan, however, because it "insuffi-
ciently neutralize[d] the adverse impact upon minority voting 
strength which resulted from the expansion of Port Arthur's bor-
ders. "92 The district court suggested as a plan of neutralization the 
elimination of the majority vote requirement for the two at-large 
An official action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the purpose of 
discrimination against Negroes on account of their race has no legitimacy at all 
under our Constitution or under the statute .... An annexation proved to be of 
this kind and not proved to have a justifiable basis is forbidden by § 5, whatever its 
actual effect may have been or may be. 
479 U.S. at 471 n.ll (quoting 422 U.S. at 378-79). 
8. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68. 
84 422 U.S. at 388-89 (Brennan, j., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 388-89 (quoting Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1031). 
86 459 U.S. 159 (1982). 
87 Id. at 162. 
88 Id. at 164. The eight council members and the mayor were to be elected as follows: 
(i) election of four council members from single-member districts (two with black majorities); 
(ii) election of two council members from districts made of two of the four original districts 
(one would have a black majority); (iii) at-large elections of two council members and a mayor 
from each of the two larger districts. Id. 
89 Id. 
90 459 U.S. at 170 n.2 (Powell, j., dissenting). 
91 459 U.S. at 163. 
92 Id. at 164. 
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seats, and stated that if this condition were met, it would offer its 
approva1.93 
In upholding the decision of the district court, the Supreme 
Court distinguished Port Arthur from Richmond on the facts. The 
Court stated that Port Arthur differed from Richmond in that Rich-
mond "involved a fairly drawn, single-member district system that 
adequately reflected the political strength of the black community 
in the enlarged city."94 In Port Arthur, however, preclearance was 
denied because "the postexpansion electoral system did not suffi-
ciently dispel the adverse impact of the expansions on the relative 
political strength of the black community .... "95 The Supreme 
Court's requirement here that the impact on black political strength 
be sufficiently dispelled is similar to the neutralization analysis in 
Petersburg. In Port Arthur, the Supreme Court seemed to include the 
neutralization standard in the fairness standard when it distin-
guished that case from Richmond, which was "fairly drawn" because 
the electoral system "adequately reflected the political strength of 
the black community .... "96 
The Supreme Court expanded the fairness test in Port Arthur 
to allow the district court greater discretion in deciding annexation 
cases. Thus, the district courts were given the flexibility to impose 
conditions when approving annexations. In Port Arthur, the Court 
stated that "eliminating the majority-vote requirement was an un-
derstandable adjustment" for the district court to demand.97 The 
Supreme Court explained: 
In the context of racial bloc voting prevalent in Port Arthur, 
the [majority-vote] rule would permanently foreclose a black 
candidate from being elected to an at-large seat. Removal of 
the requirement, on the other hand, might enhance the chances 
of blacks to be elected to the two at-large seats affected by the 
District Court's conditional order but surely would not guar-
antee that result.98 
The fairness test gleaned from the Richmond opinion effectively 
grants the district court the power to require progress in electoral 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 166. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 167. 
98 Id. at 167-68 (emphasis added). Removal of the majority-vote requirement could 
enhance the chances of blacks being elected because the effects of racial bloc voting could 
be diminished. See supra notes 34-35. 
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systems when approving annexations. Rather than merely approve 
or deny an annexation, the district court may condition approval 
of one electoral change on an improvement of another aspect of 
the electoral system.99 Port Arthur's black community comprised a 
minority of voters before and after the annexation. In the pre-
annexation electoral scheme, council members were elected at-large, 
thus "foreclos[ing] a black candidate from being elected .... "100 By 
requiring that the city abandon the majority-vote rule as a condition 
to obtaining preclearance for its annexation plan, the Supreme 
Court in effect mandated that the post-annexation system must be 
an improvement on the old scheme, in the interest of fairness. 
In a dissenting opinion in Port Arthur, Justice Powell, joined by 
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, attacked the majority's grant of 
discretion to the district courts as "authoriz[ing] a standardless eq-
uitable jurisdiction in district courts." 101 Although Justice Powell 
recognized the power of a district court to disagree with the Attor-
ney General's findings, he stated "it does not follow that the District 
Court was 'sitting as a court of equity' . . . and had the power to 
require political enhancement."102 
In addition, Justice Powell refused to recognize that the holding 
in Port Arthur was consistent with Richmond or with the intent of 
Congress in enacting Section 5: "The theory that political strength 
should be enhanced, rather than preserved, is new doctrine. It is a 
view Congress has never embraced .... "103 
B. The Retrogression Test 
Justice Powell's assertion in the Port Arthur dissent is supported 
by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act in 
non-annexation Section 5 cases. 104 The fairness standard adapted 
from the Richmond case, which allows for the enhancement of a 
99 For example, in Port Arthur, the city had to abandon the majority-vote rule in order 
to get approval for the annexation. 459 U.S. at 167-68. This can be viewed as progressive 
because abandoning the majority-vote rule has the potential to reduce the effects of racial 
bloc voting. See supra notes 34-35. 
100 Port Arthur, 459 U.S. at 167. 
101 459 U.S. at 169 (Powell, j., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 173. 
103 Id. at 172-73. As support for this statement, Justice Powell cited a Senate Committee 
Report: "Electoral devices, including at-large elections, per se would 'not be subject to attack 
under Section 2. They would only be vulnerable if, in the totality of circumstances, they 
resulted in the denial of equal access to the electoral process .... " Id. at 173 n.4 (quoting 
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 (1982)). 
104 See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
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minority's political power as a condition of annexation, has not been 
applied to other electoral changes which affect political represen-
tation. In a line of cases involving redistricting and electoral 
changes, the Court has held that the congressional intent behind 
Section 5 was to preserve the status quo of political representation, 
even where voting discrimination continues to exist. Thus a change 
in the electoral system which results in discrimination may be pre-
cleared, so long as the discrimination is not worse than before the 
electoral change. The Supreme Court permits voting discrimination 
in these cases so long as it is not regressive. 
In Beer v. United States,105 the city of New Orleans submitted a 
redistricting plan for preclearance after its 1970 census. Within the 
city limits, 35 percent of the registered voters were black. 106 Prior 
to the 1970 plan, the city was divided into five electoral districts, 
running roughly north to south through the city, with one council 
member elected from each district and two council members elected 
at-large. In one of these council districts, roughly half of the voters 
were black. In the other four districts white voters had a clear 
majority.107 The disparity between the percentage of black voters in 
the city and their underrepresentation in council districts may be 
attributed to the north-south design of the districts and the east-
west progression of the predominantly black neighborhoods. lOB Fol-
lowing rejection by the Attorney General of one plan,109 the city 
submitted to the district court a plan similar to the pre-1970 census 
plan, in which one of the five council districts had a majority of 
black voters of 52.6 percent. The other four districts had white 
majorities. 11o 
The district court rejected this plan, on the basis that it "would 
have the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of color."lll 
The district court based its decision on two determinatons. First, 
blacks would not be represented reasonably in proportion to their 
105 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
106 [d. at 134. 
107 [d. at 135. 
108 [d. at 135-36. A district plan that would logically provide more proportional repre-
sentation would be districts in an east-west direction, like the direction of the black neigh-
borhoods. 
109 There were two plans submitted for approval. The Attorney General objected to the 
first plan because blacks did not constitute a majority of voters in any of the districts. The 
plan discussed here is a second plan, which the city began preparing even before the Attorney 
General objected to the first plan. See id. at 135-36. 
ilO [d. 
ill [d. at 136. 
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share of the city's registered voters. 1 12 Second, the continued use of 
two at-large council seats served to minimize the black vote. ll3 The 
district court thus advanced a variation of the fairness standard 
enunciated in Richmond. 114 
Upon review, the Supreme Court patently rejected the holdings 
of the district court. The Court held that because the at-large seats 
had been part of the city's electoral system since 1954, they were 
not subject to review. The Court viewed the two at-large seats as a 
continuation of an existing practice, not a new practice under the 
1970 plan. Since "[t]he language of [Section] 5 clearly provides that 
it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures,"115 the 
Court found that the at-large seats were not subject to review under 
Section 5. 116 
In overruling the lower court, the Supreme Court cited the 
legislative history of the Act: 
Section 5 was a response to a common practice in some juris-
dictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by 
passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones 
had been struck down .... Congress therefore decided, as the 
Supreme Court held it could, 'to shift the advantage of time 
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim,' by 
'freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless the 
changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory.'1l7 
The Beer Court drew on a Senate Report which stated that the 
intent behind Section 5 was '''to insure that [the gains thus far 
112 [d. 
113 [d. at 137-38. 
114 See id. The Richmond case required that a new electoral plan "afford [minorities] 
representation reasonably equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged community." 
Richmond, 422 U.S. at 370. 
115 Beer, 425 U.S. at 138. 
116 [d. at 138-39. 
117 [d. at 140 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 57-58 (1975)). The 
Court also cited Katzenbach for this proposition. 425 U.S. at 140. This is misleading, however, 
because it ignores the main thrust of the Katzenbach opinion, which acknowledged that the 
purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to "rid the country of racial discrimination in voting." 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315. The Katzenbach Court stated that 
Congress knew that some of the States covered by § 4(b) of the Act had resorted to 
the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole 
purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination .... Congress had reason to suppose 
that these States might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the 
remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself. 
[d. at 335. It thus appears that the Katzenbach Court viewed the Act as a progressive tool 
toward combatting voting discrimination, rather that an instrument to merely prevent ret-
rogression. 
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achieved in minority political participation] shall not be destroyed 
through new [discriminatory] procedures and techniques."'118 The 
Court read this narrowly, holding that "the purpose of [Section] 5 
has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would 
be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise." 119 
With that pronouncement, the Supreme Court held that the 
Voting Rights Act, which ten years before was hailed as the instru-
ment to "rid the country of racial discrimination in voting,"120 had 
always been intended to preserve the status quo. With this new 
perspective, the Court concluded that an "ameliorative" plan such 
as the one at issue in Beer could not violate Section 5 "unless the 
new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or 
color as to violate the Constitution."121 In a footnote, the Court gave 
examples of constitutional violations in other cases l22 and, without 
analysis, stated that such constitutional violations did not exist in 
Beer. 123 
The retrogression standard developed in Beer was further ex-
tended in Lockhart v. United States, decided in 1983. 124 Lockhart in-
volved proposed changes to the city's governing system and electoral 
scheme. Under the previous system, the Texas city was governed 
by a mayor and two council members, all serving two-year terms, 
elected in even numbered years in an at-large numbered post sys-
tem.125 A new city charter, adopted in 1973, added two additional 
council members, elected in odd-numbered years in an at-large, 
numbered post election. 126 
In a 1977 lawsuit by four Mexican-Americans challenging the 
constitutionality of Lockhart's 1973 charter, it was discovered that 
the city had never obtained preclearance under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act. 127 The plaintiffs brought a second suit to enjoin 
118 [d. at 141 (quoting S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 19 (1975». 
119 [d. at 141. 
120 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315. 
121 Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. 
122 For example, "racially motivated gerrymandering" in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339 (1960), and "one man, one vote" issues in Regester v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
Beer at 142-43 n.14. The Court did not point out that both Gomillion and Sims were pre-
Voting Rights Act cases. 
123 Beer, 425 U.S. at 142-43 n.14. 
124 460 U.S. 125 (1983). 
125 [d. at 127. 
126 [d. at 127-28. 
127 [d. at 129. The city's failure to submit electoral changes clearly flies in the face of 
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the city from employing the new electoral system pending Section 
5 preclearance. 128 The city then sought preclearance. 129 
The Attorney General refused to preclear the plan because of 
its provisions regarding the at-large elections, numbered post sys-
tem and staggered terms. 130 The city then filed suit for a declaratory 
judgment in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 131 The 
district court held that the entire plan was subject to its review. 132 
In light of the history of racial bloc voting in the city of Lockhart, 
the district court held that the numbered posts and staggered terms 
had a discriminatory impact. 133 
On review, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's find-
ing that Lockhart's electoral system had the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote. 134 Instead, the Supreme Court stated 
that the retrogression standard pronounced in Beer was applicable 
to Lockhart. 135 In applying the retrogression standard, the Court 
held that the discriminatory effect of the new plan should be com-
pared to the plan actually in effect on November 1, 1972. 136 The 
Court therefore decided that a violation of Section 5 could only be 
established by demonstrating that the voting rights of the Mexican-
Americans in Lockhart were more abridged under the new plan 
than before. The Court found no greater abridgement, stating: 
Although the new plan may have remained discriminatory, it 
nevertheless was not a regressive change . . . . It is recognized 
Congress' intent with respect to enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court 
stated in Perkins: 
On the basis of the legislative history, there is little question that Congress sought 
to achieve this goal by relying upon the voluntary submission by affected States and 
subdivisions of all changes in such laws before enforcing them. Failure of the affected 
governments to comply with the statutory requirement would nullify the entire 
scheme since the Department of Justice does not have the resources to police 
effectively all the States and subdivisions covered by the Act .... 
Perkins, 400 U.S. at 396. 
128 Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 129. 
129 [d. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. at 130. Prior to the 1973 charter change, Lockhart was a "general law" city, 
meaning that it had only those powers specifically permitted by the State of Texas. [d. at 
127. The State did not specifically permit the use of numbered posts. Thus, the district court 
did not recognize the city's pre-1973 use of numbered posts, and treated the numbered post 
system as an electoral change, subject to § 5 preclearance. [d. at 130. 
133 [d. at 130. 
134 [d. at 136. 
135 [d. at 133. 
136 [d. at 132. 
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that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances, may have 
the effect of discriminating against minorities in a city where 
racial bloc voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may 
frustrate the use of 'single-shot voting,' a technique that permits 
concentrating support behind a single candidate. Lockhart has 
used numbered posts, however, consistently since 1917. Effec-
tive single-shot voting may be impossible now, but it was equally 
impossible under the old system .... 
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory 
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce the 
opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight individ-
ual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has not di-
minished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities . . . . 
Minorities are in the same position every year that they used to 
be in every other year. Although there may have been no im-
provement in their voting strength, there has been no retro-
gression either. 137 
401 
Thus, the Court announced that under Section 5 of the Act, covered 
jurisdictions will be permitted to continue to discriminate against 
minority voters, so long as the discrimination does not get worse. 
In a scathing dissent, Justice Marshall attacked the majority 
opinion as being "flatly inconsistent with the language and purpose" 
of Section 5.138 Justice Marshall maintained that the intent of Con-
gress in enacting Section 5 was to "prohibit the covered jurisdictions 
from adopting voting procedures which perpetuate past discrimi-
nation."139 Justice Marshall cited the South Carolina v. Katzenbach 
decision, which "recognized [that Section] 5 was designed to sus-
pend 'all new voting regulations pending review by federal author-
ities to determine whether their use would perpetuate voting discrim-
ination."'14o 
Marshall's dissent also pointed out that the "ameliorative" 
change in the plan in Beer was no longer an issue in the retrogression 
test. 141 Under the Court's interpretation of Section 5 in Lockhart, a 
change in the electoral scheme within a covered jurisdiction need 
not make any progress over the discrimination of the past. 142 Pro-
-cedural changes need only maintain the status quo. 
137 Id. at 134-35. 
138 460 U.S. at 137 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
139 Id. at 138. Justice Marshall's criticism of the majority opinion in Lockhart is valid. The 
retrogression standard, which allows the perpetuation of voting discrimination, is antithetical 
to Congress' intent, as stated in Katzenbach. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
140 Id. at 140 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 316) (emphasis in original). 
141 Id. at 143. 
142 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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The retrogression standard has been evaluated as "smack[ing] 
of a logic that two wrongs make a right: It allows abridgement of a 
fundamental right simply because the abridgement created by the 
new law is no worse than the abridgement which previously ex-
isted."143 Further, the retrogression test contravenes the purpose of 
the Voting Rights Act pronounced in Katzenbach, to eliminate racial 
voting discrimination. 144 A standard which permits the perpetuation 
of discrimination clearly cannot work to further this goal. 
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF THE DUAL STANDARDS 
Can the retrogression test developed in Beer and Lockhart and 
the "fairness" test developed in Richmond and Port Arthur be rec-
onciled? The retrogression standard, used in reapportionment and 
electoral system changes, measures only the deterioration of mi-
nority voting rights. The "fairness" standard gives courts the power 
to "neutralize" adverse effects of an electoral change caused by an 
annexation, by conditioning approval of an annexation upon a 
progressive change in the electoral system. 
Under the retrogression standard, as long as minority voters 
were not represented proportionately under an old electoral system, 
proportional representation does not have to be part of a proposed 
change. 145 The test for annexations, on the other hand, requires 
changes to be "fair," the adverse impact on minority voting strength 
to be "sufficiently neutralized,"146 and a minority to be reasonably 
represented in proportion to its political strength. 147 
One author has observed that in "deciding annexation cases, 
the Court has implicitly abandoned the retrogression test."148 This 
observation is an oversimplification, however. In deciding annexa-
tion cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that the dilution of 
minority votes because of an annexation is, in and of itself, a ret-
rogression. 149 An annexation must be shown to have a legitimate 
purpose. In addition, the Supreme Court has mandated that a 
143 Note, supra note 27, at 161. 
144 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra note 137 and accompanying text; Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. 
146 See generally, Port Arthur, 459 U.S. 159; Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. 1021. 
147 Richmond, 422 U.S. at 370. 
148 Note, supra note 27, at 148. 
149 "[Section] 5 was designed to cover changes having a potential for racial discrimination 
in voting, and such potential inheres in a change in the composition of the electorate affected 
by an annexation." Perkins, 400 U.S. at 388-89. 
1990] VOTING RIGHTS ACT 403 
municipality neutralize the retrogression in minority voting strength 
which cannot be avoided if the annexation is to take place. The 
Court therefore has not abandoned the retrogression standard in 
deciding annexation cases, but has mandated a remedy for an un-
avoidable retrogression. 
In annexation cases, however, the Court may go beyond ef-
fecting a remedy, when it applies the "fairness" standard. The Court 
is not compelled to compare the level of proportional representation 
prior to the annexation when it determines if a new plan is "fairly 
drawn," as in cases of redistricting,150 but instead compares a mi-
nority's representation after the annexation to its "political strength 
in the enlarged community."151 In this way, the standard of review 
under Section 5 in annexation cases is more progressive than in 
retrogression cases. 
In order to be consistent with the goals of Section 5, the Court 
should embrace the "fairness" standard of Richmond and Port Arthur 
in the retrogression test. 152 The district court in Beer implicitly at-
tempted this when it concluded that the city's plan "would have the 
effect of abridging the right to vote" because blacks were not rep-
resented reasonably in proportion to their political numbers.153 It 
is true that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was designed to guard 
against retrogression of the voting rights of minorities, but to stop 
there would be to unnecessarily limit the Act. The retrogression 
standard does not attempt to protect the constitutional "right of 
citizens of the United States to vote [from being] denied or abridged 
... on account of race .... "154 Rather, the retrogression standard 
permits the perpetuation of racial discrimination in voting. By 
adopting the retrogression standard, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted Section 5 in such a way so as to permit discrimination to be 
left intact, so long as it has existed for a long time. This has circum-
vented the purpose of the Act, to "rid the country of racial discrim-
ination in voting."155 
150 See Lockhart. 460 U.S. at 132-33. 
151 Richmond. 422 U.S. at 370; Katzenbach. 383 U.S. at 315. 
152 When the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982. Congress emphasized that § 5 is 
'''designed to insure that old devices for disenfranchisement would not simply be replaced 
by new ones .... and to prohibit the enactment of new '''complex and subtle ... schemes [that] 
perpetuate the results of past voting discrimination .... '" Lockhart. 460 U.S. at 141 (Marshall. 
J.. dissenting) (quoting from S. REP. No. 417. 97th Cong .• 2d Sess .• at 6.12.44 (1982». 
153 Beer. 425 U.S. at 136. 
154 U.S. CON ST. amend. XV. § 1. 
155 Katzenbach. 383 U.S. at 315. 
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Section 5 was intended as an instrument of progress, and has 
effected progress for minority voting rights. 156 The Act's progress 
could be furthered, however, if the Supreme Court applied the Act 
more consistently with Congress' intent. The Court could better 
serve the goals of the Voting Rights Act as enunciated in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach,157 by abrogating the retrogression standard 
in favor of the fairness standard, already recognized in annexation 
cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A century of resistance to the fifteenth amendment made nec-
essary the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Twenty-five 
years later, racial discrimination in voting persists. Since its passage, 
the Supreme Court has adopted dual standards under Section 5 of 
the Act. The "fairness" standard in annexation cases allows courts 
to require jurisdictions to improve their electoral systems. Con-
versely, the "retrogression" standard allows courts to perpetuate 
discrimination. The latter standard is antithetical to the purpose of 
Section 5. In order to be consistent with the goals of Congress in 
passing the Act, the Supreme Court should apply the fairness stan-
dard to all Section 5 preclearance cases. 
Amy Snyder Weed 
156 For example, the percentage of black Mississippians registered to vote increased 
from 6.7 percent in the early 1960's to 72.2 percent in 1980. Note, supra note 14, at 803. 
157 Namely, to "rid the country of racial discrimination in voting." Katz.enbach, 383 U.S. 
at 315. 
